This essay explores the basic definition of ‘normal’ animal behaviour, considering that it is essential to be aware of the different behaviours that are ‘natural’ to the particular individual animal if high welfare is to be maintained. The argument that elements of ‘natural living’ are undesirable is critically examined, and examples of welfare improvements to current systems are considered. Finally it is argued that restricting an animal’s natural behaviour is not just negative welfare in itself but can be used to justify further welfare neglect, creating a narrative in which an animal is a mechanical input rather than a thinking, feeling individual.
What is natural behaviour?
In Animal Machines, Harrison described cages for laying hens and crates for veal calves as so ‘unnatural’ that they cause animals to lead miserable and unhealthy lives (Harrison, 1964). Her use of natural conditions as criteria for good welfare has survived as a key component of current legislation: the fourth Freedom (FAWC, 1979) insists animals be able to express ‘normal’ behaviours through provision of ‘sufficient space, proper facilities, and company of the animals’ own kind.’ The EU’s Welfare Quality Project further defines normal social behaviours like grooming (welfarequality.net, 2009). The benefits of such freedom are well-documented, not only for mammals: cuttlefish raised in groups with sand, rocks and plastic seaweed grow and learn faster than those raised alone in bare tanks (Poirier, 2004). The consequences of deprivation are also well-explored, Wolfe and Rollin arguing that the suffering endured by lab animals housed under conditions inimical to their biological natures (i.e., nocturnal burrowing rats kept under artificial full-time light) is far worse than that caused by the more obvious cruelty of using invasive research techniques (Pond, 2012).
By keeping animals in farms, laboratories, zoos and even our own homes, we are arguably denying them their natural lifestyles and thus unavoidably many of their normal behaviours. Most advocates of natural behaviour as a welfare concept are promoting the animal’s freedom to express their instinctive behaviours within the environment in which they are retained; to live as closely as possible to how they would if we were not there. Rollin’s definition is different, equating good welfare with “nurturing and fulfilment of the animals’ natures”; that is, the multiplicity of needs and interests that constitute its biological and psychological nature (Rollin, 1993). We should endeavour to respect the ‘nature’ of the animals themselves: what Rollin calls telos, or “the pigness of a pig” (Rollin, 2007).
Specific behavioural needs
This leads to the idea that what is natural to one species of animal may not be natural to another, reflected in the Welfare Quality Project assessment criteria that specifies “species-specific natural behaviours such as foraging” (welfarequality.net, 2009). Typical behaviours give a species distinctive identity; Fixed Action Pattern behaviours like pecking or wing-flapping are recognisable chicken characteristics or ‘ethograms’ (Manning and Dawkins, 2012). Moreover, while these patterns are similar across the species, enough research has shown that they also vary by individual or breed that the ‘Fixed Action’ part of the phrase has been dropped in favour of simply ‘behaviour patterns’. Natural behaviour is an integral part of what gives an individual animal personality: a ‘cocky’ Jack Russell or a shy Pekinese. Importantly, different personalities may be more or less affected by stress and cope better or worse with certain aspects of captivity, leading to differences in welfare under the same conditions. Awareness of the different needs that are ‘natural’ to the particular animal – not just the broad species but also the individual – is essential if high welfare is to be maintained.
Drawbacks of ‘natural’ living
One early, and continued, defence of intensive farming is the benefits it brings to animals such as safety from predators and a steady supply of balanced diet and sanitary water (Carron and Bekoff, 1998). Yet being able to express ‘natural’ behaviour does not mean living in ‘nature’; in this context, captivity can reasonably offer a welcome respite from a harsh life full of dangers (Tannenbaum, 2001). Even within captivity, the outcomes of natural living aren’t always desirable. Fraser, for instance, cites high neonatal mortality in outdoor pig units and increased levels of parasitism among chickens on organic farms (Fraser, 2008). In the wild, animals must make constant decisions e.g., using Optimal Foraging Theory (OFT) to decide where and when to feed (Manning and Dawkins, 2012). When a captive animal is given food at a specific time each day, these complex decision-making processes are no longer necessary. Some might see this as a positive reduction of stress: one veterinarian states “by-and-large the standard of welfare among animals kept in the so-called “intensive” systems is higher… [the animal] is freer from disease and attack by its mates; it receives much better attention from the attendants, is sure of shelter and bedding and a reasonable amount of good food and water” (Taylor, 1972). Yet the existence of complex pet food-dispensing toys hints that the associated lack of mental stimulation leads to frustration and boredom. The prevalence of oral stereotypies in captivity – repetitive, functionless activities like bar biting, vacuum chewing and excessive drinking – also offer strong evidence that animals remain highly motivated to perform natural food-associated behaviours.
Further examples demonstrate human ‘protection’ weakening an animal’s natural resistance. In New Zealand, Romney sheep are allowed to graze freely in all weather conditions; they receive very little veterinary intervention and if an animal goes lame or cannot give birth, it is simply allowed to die. This means that Romneys have evolved to be much tougher than their UK cousins, where veterinary care is used to intervene in routine processes (Henson, 2017).
Motivation research
Building on preference testing, where an animal is given a choice between two scenarios, motivation research is an established way to learn from the animal which natural behaviours are desirable. The amount of work an animal is willing to do to express a certain behaviour will reflect the strength of their motivation. Sometimes the natural behaviours of the animal are so strong that, in an unnatural learning situation, it performs patterns that delay reward. Breland saw that despite their behaviours delaying the arrival of food, pigs would root with their snouts and chickens scratch and peck at the ground (Breland and Breland, 1961). There are many such examples of animals unable to overcome their natural unconditioned response and experiencing internally motivated behaviours regardless of where they are kept. The desire to nest, for instance, has been shown to be more important to a hen than eating food after 72 hours of starvation (Follensbee and Duncan, 1992). Lorenz, a father of modern ethology, describes the state of mind of a hen in a situation of such deprivation as ‘torture’ (1980). There is also evidence to suggest that the level of motivation may increase over a period of deprivation. Given the opportunity, chickens will dustbathe in litter every 2-3 days. Using motivation testing, Vestergaard revealed a huge surge in dustbathing when hens were allowed access to litter after a longer period without (1980).
Such research has led to welfare improvements for animals within current intensive systems because it follows that the better we understand what an animal desires, the more able we are to provide a compromise. Calves can sometimes suck from an artificial teat; the EU requires caged hens have 750 cm² of space, a perch, nest-box and litter; and ‘get away’ farrowing systems allow sows to initiate weaning.
The circle of deprivation
Restricting an animal’s natural behaviour is not just negative welfare in itself; it also justifies further welfare neglect. If we prevent animals behaving naturally, it becomes easier to ignore that they are thinking, feeling beings with distinct personalities and simply see them as creatures that “eat without pleasure, cry without pain, act without knowing it… desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing” (Malebranche). Pigs are naturally intelligent and emotional but ‘exceptionally stupid’ variations have been bred for food production because the distress of ‘normal’ pigs affects the quality and quantity of their flesh (Hursthouse, 2000). Animals who do not naturally fit in the captive environment are thus subjected to ‘‘technological sanders’’ that allow producers to “force square pegs into round holes—antibiotics, feed additives, hormones, air handling systems—so the animals do not die and produce more and more kilograms of meat or milk” (Rollin, 2015). By masking the animal’s natural characteristics, we insert it back into a Descartes-style narrative where it is a cog in a machine. We can thus ignore the ‘inconvenient truth’ of animal feelings (Bekoff and Pierce, 2017, p.29) and allow highly profitable animal industries to continue unchallenged, with animals suffering through lack of individual attention, physical and psychological deprivation and a lack of ‘animal smart’ employees: sources of suffering “not captured by the vocabulary of cruelty” (Rollin, 2012).
When farmers ignore individual animals, it makes more economic sense to use more unhappy pigs than fewer happier ones; thus productivity does not verify good welfare. Yet productivity can be a useful indicator of welfare when applied to a single animal (Norwood and Lusk 2011). On farms where the manager named their cows, milk yield was 258 litres higher than on farms where they were not individualised (Bekoff and Pierce, 2017). Smaller scale farming feasibly has potential to increase productivity alongside welfare, because farmers are better able to attend to individuals.
Conclusion
It is telling that the narrative of organic farming is constructed of ‘happy’ animals, displaying joy at play, dustbathing and other natural behaviours. Organic systems give animals back their unique personalities along with their freedom to express instinctive behaviour. Farmers can comfortably treat their animals as individuals with capacity to feel pleasure and pain, because they feel confident they are not causing them the latter. To restrict an animal’s natural behaviour is a two-pronged welfare insult: we deny them physical and mental satisfaction, and we deny them their singular identity. Consequently, preventing natural behaviour gives license for ‘massive cruelty to animals’ (Coren, 2006).
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